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Nunes v. Lizza and the Assumption of a Good Reputation

By Jaron Holzer '26


Does the law provide the right to the assumption of a good reputation? While the answer to this question may seem to be “yes” prima facie (at first sight), it becomes more nuanced upon further consideration.


The U.S. Constitution appears to suggest that, at the very least, the law grants the right to the assumption of a neutral reputation. For instance, the Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures” of property without “probable cause.” (1) The law’s provision of such protection seems to imply that it grants the right to the assumption of at least a neutral reputation, for its requirement of “probable cause” to conduct “unreasonable searches and seizures” would be unlikely if it were assumed that the subject of any search or seizure had a track record of wrongdoing. (2) Additionally, the Sixth Amendment vests the accused with the right to trial “by an impartial jury.” (3) The law’s provision of this security similarly seems to imply that it grants the right to the assumption of at least a neutral reputation, since its requirement for the accused to be tried “by an impartial jury” would be unlikely if it were assumed that the accused was predisposed to breaking the law. (4)


Although the Fourth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution suggest that the law provides the right to the assumption of at least a neutral reputation, this is far from providing the right to the assumption of a good reputation. A close examination of a U.S. Court of Appeals case further calls into question whether the law provides the right to the assumption of a good reputation.


In Nunes v. Lizza (2025), former congressman and current presidential advisor Devin G. Nunes sued journalist Ryan Lizza and Hearst Magazines, Inc. for defamation. (5)


Nunes filed his lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa in 2019. Nunes and NuStar Farms (Nunes’ family farm) alleged that Lizza and Hearst expressly and implicitly defamed them in a 2018 Esquire article by suggesting that NuStar illegally employed noncitizens. (6) The district court dismissed Nunes’ case because “Lizza’s statements were not defamatory” and “Nunes failed to allege that Lizza and Hearst acted with reckless disregard” for the truth. (7) However, the Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings on Nunes’ defamation by implication claim because “a reasonable reader could draw a defamatory implication from Lizza’s article” and “Nunes’ complaint plausibly asserted that Lizza acted with reckless disregard for the truth by republishing the article” on Twitter. (8)


Nunes filed an amended complaint in the district court, claiming defamation by implication (defamation characterized by technically true statements with false insinuations). (9) The district court consolidated his implicit defamation claim with NuStar’s express and implicit defamation claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Lizza and Hearst because Nunes and NuStar did not produce a genuine dispute of material fact on some elements of their claims. (10) Nunes appealed this decision to the Eighth Circuit, which reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo (anew) and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.


The Eighth Circuit applied California law to Nunes’ express and implicit defamation claims, which both the plaintiff and defendants agreed was appropriate because Nunes was a California resident and the allegedly defamatory article was published in California. The court ruled that, under California law, Nunes was eligible only for the recovery of special damages, which encompass economic loss, because he did not meet California’s notice and demand requirement. (11) Nunes failed to meet this requirement because he could not prove that either he or NuStar Farms requested Lizza and Hearst to retract the allegedly defamatory article within twenty days of discovering its publication. Nunes argued that he was owed special damages because Lizza’s article harmed his political career and caused his campaign finances to suffer by insinuating that NuStar illegally employed noncitizens, which, according to Nunes, damaged his reelection campaign. However, Nunes failed to produce sufficient evidence of special damages, and the Eighth Circuit rejected Nunes’ argument and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, for Nunes won his reelection campaign and provided insufficient evidence that either his campaign funding or employment prospects suffered following the article’s publication. (12)


NuStar Farms contended that it was defamed by Lizza and Hearst and that it lost a customer’s business and suffered general reputational harm following the article’s publication. Under conflict-of-laws principles, Iowa law applied to NuStar’s defamation claim because NuStar Farms was located in Iowa. The Eighth Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants because NuStar Farms provided insufficient evidence of the loss of a business relationship, and NuStar Farms provided insufficient evidence that it possessed a good reputation before the alleged defamation occurred, as required by Iowa precedent. (13) Under that precedent (Schlegel v. Ottumwa Courier), defamation plaintiffs must demonstrate that they possessed a particular reputation before the alleged defamation occurred to prove reputational harm. Due to all the reasons specified above, the Eighth Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, thus affirming the original judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.


The Eighth Circuit’s application of the Schlegel precedent to its grant of summary judgment in favor of Lizza and Hearst casts doubt upon the notion that the law provides the right to the assumption of a good reputation, since under the Schlegel precedent, plaintiffs are not entitled to the presumption that they possess a particular reputation under Iowa defamation law. (14) But are we entitled to the assumption that we possess a good reputation?


According to the Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, to assume is “to take for granted without substantiating evidence or proof.” (15) Therefore, the answer to the question of whether we are entitled to the assumption that we possess a good reputation turns on whether we deserve others to think highly of us without reason.


No individual has the legal right for others to think highly of them without reason, since the burden of proof plays an integral role in the law, and “reasonable suspicion” is generally the least stringent burden of proof. (16) It follows that we are not entitled to the assumption that we possess a good reputation. This principle has legal ramifications that extend beyond the scope of Iowa defamation law. For example, strict liability, under which a person may be held responsible for wrongdoing without prior intent, is applicable under both Florida civil and criminal law. (17) The applicability of strict liability under Florida law bolsters the claim that we are not entitled to the assumption that we possess a good reputation by showing that our antecedent intentions are sometimes irrelevant to the result of case proceedings.


The integral role played by the Schlegel decision in determining the outcome of Nunes v. Lizza both undermines the notion that the law provides the right to the assumption of a good reputation and highlights the legal relevance of whether we are entitled to the assumption that we possess a good reputation. Furthermore, Nunes v. Lizza itself magnifies the importance of identifying the fine line between defamation and free speech. While this piece introduces the legal implications of the discussion surrounding the assumption of a good reputation, future scholarship should more thoroughly examine the relationship between the assumption of a good reputation and legal doctrine.


Endnotes

  1. Constitution Annotated, “U.S. Constitution—Fourth Amendment,” Constitution Annotated, Library of Congress, 2025, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-4/.

  2. Ibid.

  3. Constitution Annotated, “U.S. Constitution—Sixth Amendment,” Constitution Annotated, Library of Congress, 2025, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-6/.

  4. Ibid.

  5. 126 F.4th 1361 (2025), Westlaw, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I8e5a5080dcf011ef816f81df735223e0/View/FullText.html?docFamilyGuid=I8f140390dcf011efaa10872d04d0e2df&ppcid=d3ff847bda7147b79cac9214fa4eeccc&transitionType=History&contextData=%28sc.DocLink%29.

  6. 476 F. Supp. 3d 824 (2020), Westlaw, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2051599161&pubNum=0007903&originatingDoc=I8e5a5080dcf011ef816f81df735223e0&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search).

  7. Ibid.

  8. Nunes v. Lizza, 12 F.4th 890 (8th Cir. 2021), Westlaw, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=2054497037&pubNum=0008173&originatingDoc=I8e5a5080dcf011ef816f81df735223e0&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search).

  9. Nolo, “Defamation by Implication,” Nolo Legal Dictionary, 2025, https://dictionary.nolo.com/defamation-by-implication.html.

  10. Ibid.

  11. West’s Annotated California Civil Code § 48a (2017), Westlaw, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000200&cite=CACIS48A&originatingDoc=I8e5a5080dcf011ef816f81df735223e0&refType=RB&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0.

  12. Ibid.

  13. Schlegel v. Ottumwa Courier, 585 N.W.2d 217, 225 (Iowa 1998), Westlaw, https://1.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=Y&serNum=1998216638&pubNum=0000595&originatingDoc=I8e5a5080dcf011ef816f81df735223e0&refType=RP&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0.

  14. Ibid.

  15. Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, “Assume,” Wex Legal Encyclopedia, 2025, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/assume.

  16. Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, “Burden of Proof,” Wex Legal Encyclopedia, 2025, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/assume.

  17. Bill Allen Law, “Strict Liability in Florida,” Blog, 2023, https://billallenlaw.com/what-is-meant-by-strict-liability-in-florida/.

 
 
 

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Florida Undergraduate Law Review 2024 | University of Florida

All opinions expressed herein are those of individual authors and are not endorsed by the Florida Undergraduate Law Review. The Florida Undergraduate Law Review is a student-run organization and does not reflect the views of the University of Florida.

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