Let’s Own An Airline!

By Kim-Linh Vo '28

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Introduction

It is often said that if people work together, they can achieve anything, but does that include buying an airline? On May 2nd, 2026, Spirit Airlines CEO Dave Davis announced plans to cease all operations after the spike in fuel costs caused by the U.S. conflict in Iran. (1) While the majority of the public reacted with disappointment, voice actor and content creator Hunter Peterson posed this very question: if enough people pooled their money together, could they buy Spirit Airlines? (2)

The project was an ambitious endeavor, and since the original post, Peterson has pivoted his aim to building the collectively owned airline that he and many others had envisioned for Spirit. (3) Whether it is a revitalization of Spirit Airlines or a completely new company, an airline owned by the public is a novel one in the United States. The decentralized nature of a collective initiative for starting and running an airline comes in direct conflict with the current regulatory and corporate systems designed to support traditional, centralized entities. This structural mismatch has far-reaching implications for the movement's strategic viability.

The Attempt to Buy Spirit Airlines

Spirit 2.0: The Collective Buying Initiative

In the early stages of the initiative following the original Instagram video, Peterson’s ultimate goal was to raise $5 million by June 17th, 2026, to complete an Indication of Interest (IOI) document. (4) This document would provide a non-binding expression of interest to build a new version of Spirit: Spirit 2.0. (5) Peterson planned to complete the IOI by garnering pledges that the general public could promise to provide at least $45 in funds in support of the project.

These pledges served two purposes. First, though no funds were actually raised, the pledges were proof that there was mass interest in a collectively owned airline. Second, the growing number of pledges created visible momentum, encouraging individuals with greater financial capacity to consider contributing more substantial amounts. This early momentum reflected how much Spirit’s shutdown had resonated with travelers who relied on its low‑cost model. 

Initially, it was clear that many people cared about the project. As an ultra-low-cost carrier (ULCC), Spirit offered flights in lower price ranges. (6) This made flights accessible for not only its customers, but also for a vast majority of Americans seeking to save on flights, as the presence of a ULCC incentivized other airlines to offer more competitive, lower pricing for similar flights. (7) Following the shutdown, multiple reports found prices jumped by 23% to 25% just a week after Spirit made its announcement. (8) Factoring in its market position as a ULCC, it was clear why the Spirit 2.0 project gained national attention.

The New Initiative: Build a New Airline

As the pledge campaign unfolded, the movement relied heavily on social media updates to maintain momentum and demonstrate growing interest. However, on June 18th, Peterson posted an update saying that they had not met the funds for the IOI, raising only $2.2 million by the deadline. (9) In this same announcement, Peterson announced his intentions to shift towards building an airline from the ground up instead of from the legacy of Spirit Airlines. (10) Given the shortfall, the movement shifted toward a model that did not require acquiring an existing airline.

Evaluating the Regulatory Landscape

To understand the limits of the collectively owned model for an airline, it is important to examine how federal aviation law is built around centralized control–a design that stands in tension with the movement’s decentralized vision. 

The FAA Safety Certification 

The foundational requirement for any airline is certification from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which verifies the safety and operational abilities of the airline. (11) The FAA’s applicable ownership rules assume a traditional corporate structure: the president and at least two‑thirds of the board must be U.S. citizens, and at least 75% of voting interest must be owned or controlled by U.S. citizens. (12)

These requirements presuppose centralized leadership and concentrated voting power. (13) A collectively owned airline disperses ownership and decision-making across thousands of participants, making it difficult to satisfy the FAA’s demand for identifiable control. As a result, before the safety aspects are even addressed, Spirit 2.0 would need to adopt a centralized governance model to comply, undermining its decentralized vision. 

The DOT Economic Fitness Certification

The second certification needed in the U.S. is from the Department of Transportation (DOT) to verify the operating entity is “fit, willing, and able” to run the airline. (14) These qualities are determined by a three-part economic fitness test that evaluates managerial competence, operating and financial plans, and their compliance history. (15)

Notably, these safety criteria assume a stable management structure capable of exercising operational control and sustaining long‑term financial obligations. For a collectively owned airline, this presents two structural challenges. First, the decentralized governance model complicates DOT’s ability to identify a responsible management team. Second, the financial fitness requirement is difficult to satisfy through crowdfunding or membership‑based funding, which are inherently unstable and subject to regulatory limits on investment solicitation.

These regulatory constraints illustrate why Spirit 2.0’s model struggles at the threshold: the legal framework presumes centralized authority, and a collectively owned airline cannot satisfy that presumption without abandoning its core design. With this in consideration, even as Peterson continues to post updates and outline long‑term plans for working around these structural challenges, the movement’s actual progress remains at a standstill. 

The Strategic Viability of a Collectively Owned Airline

A primary lesson of the Spirit 2.0 movement is one that is less about the feasibility of the campaign and more about the limits of the current regulatory framework. Its legal architecture was based on and written for businesses with centralized authority and hierarchical decision‑making. Against this backdrop, a collectively owned airline is already set up for failure because the system is designed for a structure that is the direct opposite of its core principle.

This contrast in structure is not surprising, as collectively owned or democratically governed enterprises have struggled to gain long-term footing for years in the United States. Out of tens of millions of businesses operating in America, only a small fraction are cooperatives or employee‑owned firms. (16) 

Instead of asking whether a collectively owned airline can be made to fit within the existing regulatory structure, it may be more productive to ask why the structure excludes it. What assumptions about ownership, control, and economic power are embedded in federal law? What would a regulatory system that allows for alternative business models look like across all industries, not just in aviation?

Spirit 2.0 may not have produced an airline, but it could represent an early step toward building industrial frameworks that support consumer‑forward, collectively owned business models.

Endnotes

1. Archie Mitchell, “Spirit Airlines Shutting Down After Rescue Talks Collapse,” BBC News, May 2, 2026, http://bbc.com/news/articles/cqxlnrqjvzyo.

2. Hunter Peterson, “Let’s Buy Spirit Airlines,” Instagram, May 4, 2026, https://www.instagram.com/p/DX2AP7LsXk0/.

3. Hunter Peterson, “We’re Not Buying an Airline Now. We’re Building One,” Instagram, June 18, 2026, https://www.instagram.com/p/DZv7-ZKFp5S/?img_index=2.

4. Ibid.

5. 17 C.F.R. § 230.241(c), “Solicitations of Interest.”

6. Alexander R. Bachwich and Michael D. Wittman, “The Emergence and Effects of the Ultra-Low Cost Carrier (ULCC) Business Model in the U.S. Airline Industry,” Journal of Air Transport Management 62 (July 2017): 155–64, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2017.03.012.

7. Ibid.

8. Megan Cerullo, Kris Van Cleave, and Sarah Ploss, “What Does Spirit Airlines’ Shutdown Mean for Travelers?,” CBS News, May 4, 2026, https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/spirit-airlines-tickets-flghts-shutting-down-impact/; Vinod Sreeharsha, “Does It Cost More to Fly after Spirit Airlines Shutdown? ‘Upward Pressure,’” Miami Herald, May 19, 2026, https://www.miamiherald.com/living/travel/article315777586.html.

9. Peterson, “We’re Not Buying an Airline Now.”

10. Ibid.

11. Federal Aviation Administration, “Title 14 CFR Part 135 Air Carrier and Operator Certification: General Requirements for Certification,” 2022, https://www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/airline_certification/135_certification/general_req.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. 49 U.S.C. § 41102(b), “General, Temporary, and Charter Air Transportation Certificates of Air Carriers.”

15. Air Carrier Fitness Division and Office of the Secretary, How to Become a Certified Aircraft Carrier (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 2012), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Certificated_Packet_2012_final.pdf.

16. National Cooperative Business Association, “Cooperative Industries & Sectors,” NCBA CLUSA, 2022, https://ncbaclusa.coop/resources/co-op-sectors/; National Center for Employee Ownership, “Employee Ownership by the Numbers,” 2022, https://www.nceo.org/research/employee-ownership-by-the-numbers.