Epistemological Humility and Pragmatic Judgment: Our Inherent Philosophical Frameworks and Their Parallel in the Legal System

By George Ata '26

Guest Writer, University of South Florida

---

Philosophical Foundation

René Descartes' famous declaration in the Second Meditation has become one of the most iconic phrases in Western philosophy, often cited as the foundational statement of modern rational thought:

“But doubtless I exist, since I observe that I doubt.” (1)

Yet, it captures an aspect of reality so glaring it is astonishing how rarely we pause to reflect on its poignant implications; for reality exhibits a peculiar condition: the closest we approach certainty is through acknowledging our uncertainty. This paper argues that due to the inherent limits of human cognition and the impossibility of absolute certainty, pragmatic decision-making—structured by coherence, consequence, and epistemological humility—necessarily underpins both philosophical inquiry and practical legal judgment.

Fundamentally speaking, what can one be certain of? For instance, can one even be certain of external reality, specifically, of other minds?

No matter how much empirical evidence one obtains, we remain philosophically barred from absolute certainty regarding other minds and most aspects of existence. Our direct experiences, such as observing actions and empirical evidence like brain scans, guide us into a leap of faith—no matter how slight—during which we approximate truth among countless possibilities.

David Hume recognized this fragility, observing: “The slightest philosophy teaches us that the solidest basis for belief is the custom and experience of the senses; yet, when we reflect more deeply, we see that even these are not absolutely reliable.” (2) Even foundational sources: our senses and customs are fallible and vulnerable to illusion accompanied by inescapable subjective habit rather than logical necessity. Similarly, Immanuel Kant extended this critique to reason itself, stating: “Transcendental illusion arises...from the nature of human reason itself, and is unavoidable.” (3) Kant emphasized our rational faculties' susceptibility to systematic illusion, highlighting our limited access to the “noumenal” or the thing-in-itself. (4)

Thus, it seems that when we scrutinize even our most foundational or trivial beliefs, whether empirical, logical, or perceptual, we tend to approximate rather than assert regardless of the abundance of evidence. Accordingly, a “leap of faith” becomes necessary when we are faced with the inescapable task of consciously selecting or acting upon one approximation over another. Every decision, every belief enacted, is a leap: a wager that one possibility is more likely to actualize than the rest. In acting with its consequences in mind, we inevitably forgo at least some of the consequences tied to other plausible but unchosen alternatives.

As we confront the limits of certainty, we find ourselves nevertheless required to choose, to act, and to believe. In this way, our epistemic condition imposes not only ignorance but also the obligation of judgment. Psychologist and philosopher William James recognized this condition as both inevitable and necessary. In The Will to Believe, he writes, “our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.” (5) His insight echoes the principle at the heart of this paper: that belief and action do not await certainty, nor are they absolved by it. Rather, we are structurally situated to act upon approximations.

Pragmatic Framework Defined

Pragmatism, in this context, is defined as a method of belief/truth selection guided by coherence and consequence in recognition of one’s epistemic limits. Our rational faculties, equipped with inherent logical constructs, are the sole verification tools we possess to interpret experience. A belief must thus fit within our broader network of understanding, the closest approximation to truth, while leading to practically justifiable outcomes. Coherence ensures consistency with logic; consequence interpreted through principles such as cost-benefit reasoning, probability, and Occam’s Razor—grounds belief in effects.

Pragmatism, structured by these principles, becomes an inherent mode of human judgment. It enables us to navigate between necessary approximations, each requiring epistemic humility and a leap of faith, which is structurally mirrored in our judicial system. 

Legal Parallels

Our legal system embodies pragmatic epistemology. The Supreme Court decision In re Winship (1970) constitutionally entrenched the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt," explicitly acknowledging unattainable absolute certainty. (6) 

The highest standard of proof that the court recognizes is not "beyond all doubt," but beyond a reasonable doubt; presenting the court’s glaring acknowledgment of jurors’ inevitable shortcomings towards absolute certainty on the matter. 

The decision to convict is thus a pragmatic leap, as it best coheres with the totality of evidence and produces a justifiable outcome with the stakes of the conviction and the risk of error in mind.

Another fundamental manifestation of epistemological humility in our legal system is the requirement of jury unanimity. Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) reaffirmed the indispensable role of jury unanimity in criminal proceedings, solidifying the notion that legal judgments must be communally validated to minimize subjective or isolated approximations of truth. (7) It is insufficient for 11 jurors to decide that guilt is the most coherent and consequential interpretation of the facts; all twelve must arrive at this approximation together. This demand for unanimity acts as a safeguard against idiosyncratic leaps of faith; it compels individual approximations to conform to a communal standard of coherence. In this way, the legal system reinforces that our judgments under uncertainty are not purely subjective; they require social validation as well as adherence to the coherent framework of pragmatism.

Several legal scholars have recognized the pragmatic nature of our judicial system as well. For instance, Richard Posner explicitly argues in his book The Problems of Jurisprudence that judicial decisions often cannot be logically derived from clear-cut rules but must consider practical consequences, probabilities, and societal impacts, core elements of the pragmatism framework outlined here. (8) 

Additionally, Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivist approach to jurisprudence in his work Justice in Robes further underscores epistemological humility. (9) Dworkin suggests that judges must weave coherent narratives from fragmented or ambiguous legal materials. Thus, the interpretative act itself becomes a pragmatic exercise, structured by coherence and consistency, which parallels the pragmatic epistemic framework identified in this paper.

James R. Steiner‑Dillon's study of epistemic exceptionalism also highlights courts’ tendency to privilege judges’ cognitive reliability over that of juries, often resulting in less rigorous evidence standards in bench trials. (10) Steiner‑Dillon argues persuasively for reform, including “instilling a culture of epistemic humility within judicial institutions.” (11) Building on this, Jason A. S. Burdon and Amy M. Scharffs delineate the concept of constitutional humility, where judges are encouraged to recognize not only cognitive limits but also the boundaries of their institutional role. (12) They claim that true judicial humility requires both epistemological deference to empirical uncertainty and institutional respect for the adversarial system and separation of powers. This layered understanding of humility exemplifies how justice functions not as a destination but as a structured, inherently uncertain process—one ideally governed by both personal epistemic modesty and institutional safeguards.

Conclusion

We may never fully grasp pure, objective justice; such a thing may lie forever beyond the veil of human cognition. Yet, that very limitation is not grounds for despair, but for recalibration. Our legal systems have clearly internalized the philosophical insight that certainty is often unattainable, and in such acknowledgment, we have transformed epistemological humility from constraint into a structural strength. 

By grounding judgment in reasoned approximation rather than unreachable absolutes, the law mirrors the deeper structures of our thinking: it privileges coherence over dogma, consequence over speculation, and communal validation over unilateral conviction. Burdens of proof, the presumption of innocence, the demand for unanimity—these are not mere legal formalities, but reflections of our inherent cognitive frameworks. They acknowledge that we are not absolved of conscious judgment in the face of uncertainty, and thus our task is not to retreat, but to proceed carefully and justifiably.

Justice, then, is not a fixed destination but a trajectory—one we navigate using coherence, consequence, and moral discernment. As we now stand at the threshold of transformative technologies, including artificial intelligence, the stakes of this epistemic modesty only grow. AI systems, despite their complexity, are ultimately bounded by similar limits of approximation and inference to those that constrain human judgment. If they are to aid rather than further obscure the noumenal ideal of justice, they ought to be, at least, guided by the very principles of humility and pragmatism that define our best legal thinking.

Endnotes

1. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation II (1641).

2. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding § XII, pt. I (1748).

3. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A298/B355 (1781).

4. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A295/B351 (1781).

5. William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy 11 (1897).

6. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

7. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).

8. Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard Univ. Press 1990).

9. Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard Univ. Press 2006).

10. James R. Steiner-Dillon, Epistemic Exceptionalism, 52 Ind. L. Rev. 207 (2019).

11. Jason A. S. Burdon & Amy M. Scharffs, Constitutional Humility: The Contested Meaning of a Judicial Virtue, 13 Am. Pol. Thought 395 (2023).

12. Burdon & Scharffs, supra note 12, at 419-420.